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RECENT CASE COMMENTS
BAxs AN BA-IN - SPECIAL DEPOSITS - INSOLVENCY -
PREFRENCES. - The plaintiffs owned a check for $21,241.71 in
shares to be determined by arbitration. They endorsed it to the
defendant bank "for special deposit in escrow" subject to the
award. The sum in controversy was received by the defendant
bank's trust department and deposited in the commercial depart-
ment to the credit of the "escrow agreement account". The award
was made after the bank became insolvent and the liquidating
agent refused to pay the plaintiffs the amount of the check. The
appellate court affirmed the judgment of the lower court giving
the plaintiffs a preferred claim. Parker v. Central Bank & Trust
Company of Asheville.'
This case raises the troublesome problem of the classification
of deposits with respect to the obtaining of a preference on the
insolvency of a bank by means of the trust device. The court
treats this deposit as one for a specific purpose and lays down cer-
tain criteria by which such deposits are to be determined and
classified! The court, however, makes no apparent effort to fit
the case to the standard laid down, but allows a recovery with-
out explanation when it is questionable that the measure really
fits the facts. No attempt is made to trace the funds and identify
them although the court lays it down as one of the elements for
the recovery of a deposit for a specific purpose that the fund be
definitely identified. It does not even appear that the amount of
the assets of the bank were at all times more than the amount of
the deposit! To allow a recovery on the basis of this decision leads
to but one practical result, - the creation of a preference by the
agreement of the parties themselves. As among general creditors
the law has always looked with disfavor on a preference and to
allow it, as in this case, is doubly undesirable since it arises by
force of the acts of the parties themselves. This is accomplished
by the parties agreeing at the time of deposit that the funds so
deposited will be held for the given purpose. The effect of agree-
1162 S. E. 564 (N. C. 1932).
'Ibid., syllabus 1. The court after laying down the elements of the standard
says "(5) the mere tracing of the money into the common funds of the bank
is not a sufficient identification or segregation of the deposit."
3James Roscoe (Bolton), Ltd. v. Winder, (1915) 1 Ch. 62; Mercantile
Trust Co. v. St. Louis & S. F. Ry. Co., 99 Fed. 485 (C. C., D. Mo., E. D.,
1900); Be Mulligan, 116 Fed. 715 (1902); Powell v. Missouri Co., 99 Ark.
553, 139 S. W. 299 (1911); Chase & Baker v. Olmsted, 93 Wash. 306, 160
Pac. 952 (1916).
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RECENT CASE COMMENTS
ments, however, may be modified by custom. Did not the parties
enter into the formal agreement subject to the well-known practice
of banks to use such deposits in the same manner as if they were
general deposits '
The Texas court has recognized the practical import of the
situation presented here. In the cited case that court declared
that no difference in fact exists between a deposit for a specific
purpose and a general deposit. This appears to be the practical
method of handling the problem since the transaction has the ef-
fect of a general deposit. In the case of a special deposit the de-
positor is entitled to receive back the identical thing deposited and
the bank is considered a mere bailee to whom the title to the fund
does not pass.' In such a situation the recovery by means of the
trust device is satisfactory if the fund is traceable. However, in
the "specific purpose" situation a use of the trust device to create
a preference appears to be unsound because there is no wrongful
commingling.
The principal case is supported by the numerical weight of
authority but it is submitted that the minority view as set out in
the Texas case represents the sounder logic and a more common-
sense application of the law to business transactions. 7
-FREDERICK H. BARNETT.
INJUNCTIONS - AIRPORTS - NUISANCE. - Defendants were
establishing an airport, not fully developed at the time of trial,
on 272 acres of land contiguous to Cleveland, Ohio. Plaintiffs,
owners of 135 acres of adjoining land, which they used for agri-
cultural and residential purposes, applied for an injunction against
the opening of the airport, on the ground that it would be a
"'It is the custom of banks, upon receiving money for a specific purpose,
as to pay a note, to mingle the funds with their own, and to pay the note at
the proper time, just as they would a check; the funds are not kept separate.
There is no practical difference between such a deposit and a general deposit,
and it seems clear that the bank should be held to the same liability as for
a general deposit." MORSE ON BANKS AND BANKING (6th ed. Voorhees,
1928) § 210.
'First State Bank of Seminole v. Shannon, 159 S. W. 398 (Tex. Civ. App.
1913). 1
'Alston v. State, 92 Ala. 124, 9 So. 732, 13 L. R. A. 659 (1891) ; McGregor
v. Battle, 128 Ga. 577, 58 S. E. 28, 13 L.. R. A. (N. S.) 185 (1907); Foster
v. Essex Bank, 17 Mass. 479, 9 Am. Dec. 168 (1821); Gibson v. Erie, 196
Pa. 7, 46 Atl. 102 (1900).
See generally 1 PATON'S DiGEsT (1926) § 1789.
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